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Abstract
In Moral Case Deliberation (MCD), healthcare professionals discuss ethically difficult patient situations in their daily practice. 
There is a lack of knowledge regarding the content of MCD and there is a need to shed light on this ethical reflection in the 
midst of clinical practice. Thus, the aim of the study was to describe the content of healthcare professionals’ moral reasoning 
during MCD. The design was qualitative and descriptive, and data consisted of 22 audio-recorded inter-professional MCDs, 
analysed with content analysis. The moral reasoning centred on how to strike the balance between personal convictions about 
what constitutes good care, and the perceived dissonant care preferences held by the patient. The healthcare professionals 
deliberated about good care in relation to demands considered to be unrealistic, justifications for influencing the patient, the 
incapacitated patient’s nebulous interests, and coping with the conflict between using coercion to achieve good while pro-
tecting human dignity. Furthermore, as a basis for the reasoning, the healthcare professionals reflected on how to establish 
a responsible relationship with the vulnerable person. This comprised acknowledging the patient as a susceptible human 
being, protecting dignity and integrity, defining their own moral responsibility, and having patience to give the patient and 
family time to come to terms with illness and declining health. The profound struggle to respect the patient’s autonomy in 
clinical practice can be understood through the concept of relational autonomy, to try to secure both patients’ influence and 
at the same time take responsibility for their needs as vulnerable humans.
Keywords Clinical ethics · Ethics consultation · Moral case deliberation · Health care professionals · Qualitative research
Background
Internationally, there is a consensus that healthcare profes-
sionals need clinical ethics support to be able to manage 
ethical issues in daily practice (Abma et al. 2010; Dauwerse 
et al. 2011). One kind of clinical ethics support service is 
Moral Case Deliberation (MCD). In MCD, a facilitator-led 
group of healthcare workers discuss an ethically difficult 
patient situation taken from daily practice. The role of the 
facilitator is to support an open dialogue and stimulate the 
reflection process of the group (Stolper et al. 2015). The 
purpose of the MCD is to support healthcare professionals 
in their management of such cases, and the overarching goal 
is to improve the quality of patient care (Molewijk et al. 
2008a, b).
MCD has mostly been conducted and studied in the Neth-
erlands (Dauwerse et al. 2014; Spronk et al. 2017). So far, 
research has mainly focused on the implementation of the 
method itself, and on the education of facilitators (Molewijk 
et al. 2008a, b; Plantinga et al. 2012; Stolper et al. 2015; 
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Weidema et al. 2013). A limited number of Swedish health-
care institutions practice MCD—commonly called ‘ethics 
rounds’ or ‘ethic case reflections’ (Bartholdson et al. 2014; 
Gronlund et al. 2016; Silen et al. 2016; Svantesson et al. 
2008a, 2014). Swedish studies have utilized a mix of meth-
ods to evaluate MCD (Grönlund 2016; Kälvemark Sporrong 
2007; Silen et al. 2015; Svantesson et al. 2008b) and vari-
ous different theoretical models of the discussion have been 
described in the literature (Hansson 2002). Still, knowledge 
of the actual content of the discussions is limited.
Recently, the European Moral Case Deliberation Out-
come instrument (Euro-MCD) was developed, which 
measures the desired and experienced outcomes of MCD 
(Svantesson et al. 2014). As a part of the Euro-MCD pro-
ject, 70 Swedish MCDs were audio recorded and the facili-
tators interviewed, in order to understand the content and 
outcomes of MCD.
So far, the ethically difficult situations raised in these 70 
MCDs have been identified (Rasoal et al. 2015), and the 
facilitators’ experiences of their role in MCD have been 
described (Rasoal et al. 2017). A quantitative assessment 
of the content of the dialogue revealed that moral reasoning 
composed a median of 45% of the spoken time, while reflec-
tion on the psycho-social work environment constituted 29% 
(Svantesson et al. 2017).
However, there is, as mentioned, limited knowledge 
regarding the content of the moral reasoning that takes place 
during MCD and further knowledge of the moral reason-
ing may shed light on ethical deliberation in the midst of 
clinical practice. Furthermore, the moral content may inform 
the development of valid outcome criteria for MCD, which 
are lacking (Hem et al. 2015; Metselaar et al. 2017). Thus, 
the aim of the present study was to describe the content of 
healthcare professionals’ moral reasoning during moral case 
deliberations regarding ethically difficult patient situations.
Methods
Design
This study was a qualitative, descriptive study utilizing con-
tent analysis according to Elo and Kyngäs (2008).
Setting and participants
Institutions in mid-Sweden that had access to MCD facili-
tators were recruited for the larger Euro-MCD project 
(Svantesson et  al. 2014). Inclusion was based on local 
access to a facilitator, and that the majority of employees 
had expressed a wish to be supported in ethically difficult 
situations. Furthermore, the management would have to 
guarantee that time would be given for participation. The 
institutions differed in size, and workplaces included gen-
eral internal medicine, dialysis and geriatric care. For the 
current study, exclusion criteria were MCDs without doctor 
participation and thematic session not based on real patient 
cases, which resulted in 22 audio-recorded MCDs (Fig. 1). 
The rationale for setting these exclusion criteria was that 
both the medical and nursing perspectives were secured, and 
the need to facilitate a deeper analysis compared with the 
previous study of all 70 MCDs, based on the assumption 
that patient situations better reflect everyday care (Svantes-
son et al. 2017).
The MCDs were thus inter-professional and consisted of 
nurses, nurse assistants, doctors, physiotherapists, and social 
workers. Nurses comprised the dominant profession. Facili-
tators were philosophers, chaplains, doctors and supervising 
nurses (Table 1), whose experiences of their role has been 
published elsewhere (Rasoal et al. 2017). Facilitators were 
instructed to assist healthcare staff to reflect systematically 
on an ethically difficult situation that they had encountered 
in their daily work (Svantesson et al. 2014). They were also 
presented with the following definition of an ethically dif-
ficult situation: “a situation in which you experience unease 
or uncertainty about what is right or good to do, or there 








3 workplaces excluded, due 
to no doctor attendance (22 
MCD meetings)
23 MCD meetings excluded, due to 
no doctor attendance (9), audio-
recording problems (3), thematic 
topics (4) and end of consecutive 
inclusion for this study (7)





Fig. 1  Selection of MCDs
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Data collection
MCD groups gathered on a monthly basis, on eight occa-
sions in each workplace. Sessions lasted between 60 and 
90 min. Facilitators were responsible for the audio record-
ings, which make up 24 h of recorded discussions. The 
audio-recordings were transcribed verbatim by an experi-
enced research secretary, yielding data material of 517 pages 
in total.
Data analysis
Content analysis was conducted according to (Elo and Kyn-
gas 2008), and facilitated by the software program NVivo 
10. All transcripts and audio recordings were read, and 
respectively listened to, in order to grasp a sense of the 
whole.
Initially, a deductive approach was applied, in an attempt 
to describe perspectives from principle-based and relational-
oriented ethics (including virtue ethics and ethics of care, 
as well as ethics of proximity) in the data (Svantesson et al. 
2017). This approach was, however, found to be too theoreti-
cal and thus failed to allow us to describe the essence of the 
moral reasoning. Instead, data were coded using an inductive 
approach, from the perspective of moral reasoning.
In the next step, codes that shared similar meanings 
according to the aim of the study were merged into generic 
categories. Codes and categories were continuously vali-
dated in view of the data, moving between the parts and the 
whole for the purpose of refining categories. When writing 
up the results, re-categorisation continued in the light of the 
whole. This element of the results is presented under the 
heading content, and is a latent analysis, according to Elo 
and Kyngas (2008). In trying to grasp how the discussions 
unfolded on a structural level, we utilized a more manifest 
approach. Transcripts were re-read with the aim of describ-
ing common structures of how the discussions unfolded, 
and data were re-coded according to this aim. The progress 
of each step in the analysis was scrutinized and discussed 
between the first and last authors, as well as being co-
assessed by the second and third authors, until final agree-
ment was reached both on structure and content in the data.
Ethical considerations
An advisory statement specifying no objections to the study 
was issued by the Swedish Regional Ethical Review Board 
of Uppsala (ref.nr 2012/34). Participants were informed 
about the research project verbally in meetings as well as in 
writing. Consent to being recorded was assumed by virtue 
of participation in the MCD sessions. No names or persons 
can be identified in the data, and published quotations are 
only identifiable by the persons who were present.
Results
The content of healthcare professionals’ moral reasoning 
during moral case deliberations contained the professionals’ 
deliberations of how to strike a balance between their con-
victions about what constitutes good care and the dissonant 
preferences for care held by the patient, and how to estab-
lish a responsible relationship with the vulnerable person. 
The relationship between the main-categories is illustrated 
in Fig. 2.
To understand the context of the moral reasoning that 
occurs within MCDs, the structure of the dialogue is pre-
sented first. The structure varied between meetings, work-
places and facilitators; nonetheless, a pattern could be 
detected. In some MCDs, the main task was to understand 
exactly what the ethical issue was. In other MCDs, the focus 
was on discussing possible courses of action or how to cope 
with the ethically difficult situation.
MCDs began by presenting an inventory of the differ-
ent situations or problems that the staff wanted to discuss. 
The facilitator’s role during the initial phase was to help 
the staff formulate the ethical issues based on the partici-
pants’ narratives. During this process the facilitator asked 
Table 1  Participating units






Unit 1 Community hospital Dialysis care Philosopher 6 6 (5–8)
Unit 2 Community hospital Internal medicine Philosopher 5 10 (8–13)
Unit 3 University hospital Dialysis care Two clinical supervisor nurses 3 12 (9–14)
Unit 4 District hospital Internal medicine Chaplain and deacon 2 8 (8–9)
Unit 5 Community hospital Geriatric rehabilitation Physician 2 8 (8)
Unit 6 Community hospital Geriatric rehabilitation Philosopher 4 8 (8–9)
Total 22 9 (5–14)
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for facts about the patient’s situation. These facts included 
the patient’s medical history, nursing needs and psychosocial 
situation, the family’s perspective, and the staff’s previous 
communication with the patient. Throughout the dialogue, 
the discussion continuously returned to these facts as well 
as to assumptions about the patient. The professionals made 
assumptions about the patient’s and their family members’ 
behaviour, their emotional needs, and the various possible 
consequences of the different courses of action. Altogether, 
facts and assumptions were used for the drafting of the ethi-
cal problem, which could be altered after the adding of new 
facts and assumptions. In all meetings, the healthcare pro-
fessionals expressed that they had shared experiences and 
views during the moral reasoning. However, the facilitators 
seemed to have a key role beyond structuring the dialogue, 
to provide a critical voice, often adopting the perspective of 
the absent patients and their families. The facilitators also 
introduced theoretical concepts that could shed light on the 
question at hand. They utilized ethical principles, such as 
“The Four Principles of Biomedical Ethics” as well as ethi-
cal concepts having to do with responsibility, vulnerability 
and power.
The content of the moral reasoning was captured in two 
main categories: “How to strike a balance between convic-
tions of what constitutes good care and the perceived dis-
sonant preferences for care held by the patient”; and “How 
to establish a responsible relationship with the vulnerable 
person” (Table 2).
How to strike a balance between convictions 
of what constitutes good care and perceived 
dissonant preferences for care held 
by the patient
Framing the notion of good care in relation 
to demands regarded as unrealistic from the patient 
and their family
The professionals expressed strong beliefs about what sort of 
care was in the patient’s best interest, based on their judge-
ments about the patient’s medical and nursing needs. Dur-
ing the discussions they returned to what they considered to 
be necessary and adequate care. This was a starting point 
for the reasoning about how to manage conflicting needs 
and wishes. Few doubts were expressed about what, in their 
perspective, ought to be done, nor were any expressed about 
what it meant to do good for the patient.
I have told the wife and the daughters that we make 
sure he’s not in pain, make sure he’s not anxious and 
not having a hard time with his breathing. We make 









Fig. 2  Relational autonomy in the struggle to uphold dignity in illness
Table 2  Results with main and generic categories
Main categories Generic categories
How to strike a balance between convictions of what constitutes good 
care and the perceived dissonant preferences for care held by the 
patient
Framing the notion of good care in relation to demands from patient and 
family regarded to be unrealistic
Querying with to what extent it is justifiable to influence the patient’s 
decision-making in order to achieve good care
Struggling with standing up for the incapacitated patient’s nebulous 
interests
Coping with the conflict between using coercion to achieve good while 
protecting human dignity
How to establish a responsible relationship with the vulnerable person Acknowledging the patient as a susceptible human being in a psychoso-
cial context
Guarding the patient’s dignity and integrity through practical measures 
in care
Defining personal moral responsibility towards the patient
Having patience to give the patient and family time to come to terms 
with illness and declining health
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him comfortable. That’s my main priority. (Dialysis 
care)
The staff’s convictions about what constitutes good and ade-
quate care ran into ethical difficulties, however, when the 
patient’s or the family’s preferences or wishes diverged from 
those of the professionals. Participants discussed how to 
deal with patients who demanded care; a situation that they 
felt could lead to harm or undesirable consequences for the 
patient. The demands could relate to discharge, despite the 
need for more social care or services at home, or demands 
for inappropriate medication. The potential consequences 
could include insecurity at home or addiction to narcotic 
drugs because of inappropriate medication. Both partici-
pants and facilitators emphasized that striving to achieve a 
good outcome for the seriously ill patient must be balanced 
against the patient’s right to influence their own care.
Some patients were described as demanding support and 
attention to such an extent that the staff felt uncertain about 
how to practically frame the care, both for the demanding 
patient and for the other affected patients on the unit. This 
could be, for example, a patient who expressed a need for a 
high degree of presence of the staff due to anxiety or psy-
chiatric comorbidities. The professionals judged which care 
they should prioritize, and how the needs of one patient had 
to be balanced against those of other patients in the unit.
In this situation I feel that I really would need to give 
more time. However, this takes time from the other 
patients who have needs as well. Then you get bad 
conscience and unconsciously feel an inner stress. 
(Geriatric rehabilitation).
Querying to what extent it is justifiable to influence 
the patient’s decision‑making in order to achieve 
good care
Participants struggled with situations where the patients 
refused the particular care that was offered. Professionals 
and facilitators discussed to what extent it is morally accept-
able to influence patients to try to achieve what they judged 
to be good care, based on their professional assessment of 
the necessary needs of the patient.
The dialogue centered on trying to understand the 
patient’s reasons for refusing adequate care. They could 
assume that it was based on fear and anxiety, but they could 
also describe it in terms of the patient’s lack of knowledge 
or that the patient was unable to comprehend the medical 
situation they found themselves in. The professionals experi-
enced that patients were unable to foresee the consequences 
of their own decisions. The reflections resulted in another 
ethical issue: to what extent is it acceptable to try to influ-
ence the patient to take part in the care offered, considered to 
be in their best interest; for instance, life-saving amputation 
or rehabilitation after hip fracture?
The discussions concerned how far it is morally justi-
fied to exert pressure on the patient. MCD participants were 
conscious of the patient’s right to influence care and also of 
their obligation to frame care according to patients’ wishes. 
They were concerned about the risk of being disrespectful 
in their eagerness to provide the best care.
For patients assessed as having adequate decision-making 
capacity, and who also gave good reasons for declining the 
help offered, the participants expressed less uncertainty. 
However, they expressed an obligation to further explore 
exactly on what grounds the patient had refused care. In 
one case, the staff discussed to what extent they should try 
to convince a patient that he must eat.
It feels like pieces of the puzzle are missing. Why has 
he made this decision? My intuition as a nurse tells 
me to promote health as much as possible. Of course 
he has self-determination, but why has he taken this 
decision? (Internal medicine).
Struggling with standing up for the incapacitated 
patient’s nebulous interests
It was acknowledged that the family plays an important role 
in the process of framing care according to the patient’s 
wishes, but staff also discussed conflicts with families 
regarding the interpretation of these interests. Conflicts 
evolved around feeding, surgical procedures, and the need 
for more social services and support at home. Here, a role 
of advocacy and speaking up on behalf of the patient was 
described. Patients who were perceived not to be able to 
speak up for themselves because of advanced age, demen-
tia or chronic illness, were sometimes seen as being unable 
to verbalize their needs and wishes. The professionals saw 
themselves as protectors of the patient’s rights, sometimes 
against family members’ perceptions, but also against the 
views of the home-help service. This role of advocacy 
seemed to be comprehended as an ethical demand on them, 
and as a part of their professional responsibility.
I think the thing with food is really difficult. I enjoy 
feeding people, but I don’t like forcing me on someone 
just because a daughter or a son wants it. (Geriatric 
rehabilitation).
There were reflections about uncertainties as to what it 
meant to do good for a seriously ill and older patient at the 
end of life who had limited possibilities to express their own 
wishes for care. Professionals struggled with conflicting pur-
poses inherent in care; strictly palliative aims versus more 
life-sustaining aims, such as artificial nutrition or lifesaving 
amputation. One discussion concerned how the staff could 
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do good for an old woman who rejected taking part in mobi-
lization after a hip fracture.
She has lost the will to live. For how long must one 
fight with a patient who doesn’t want to live anymore 
and what’s to do good for this patient? (Geriatric reha-
bilitation).
Coping with the conflict between using coercion 
to achieve good and protecting human dignity
In several of the patient cases that were discussed, the patient 
lacked decision-making capacity due to chronic or acute ill-
ness, and were unable to express their own wishes for care. 
Some patients in these situations also opposed care that was 
perceived by the staff as vital and necessary. In one case, a 
patient affected by dementia was running naked through the 
unit, refusing to be dressed:
It felt very difficult to leave her in that condition and 
we almost had to force her to put on dry clothes. It felt 
like that was a violation as well. It was very difficult 
to manage. (Internal medicine).
Participants were challenged on how to balance respect for 
the patient as a human being with doing good and preventing 
harm due to lack of care. In the case of the woman affected 
by dementia, staff expressed a concern for her health and 
wellbeing. Although many of these patients lacked decision-
making capacity, professionals still experienced an ethical 
dilemma when they were challenged to fulfil important 
needs without the patient’s consent, when facing resistance, 
and, in critical situations, the use of coercion. Noticeably, the 
word “violation” was used to describe the experiences of the 
professionals when they felt morally forced to use coercion. 
One confused patient needed urgent urinary catheterization, 
and staff discussed how they felt obliged to physically hold 
the patient down to carry it out, something that ultimately 
relieved his pain. Nonetheless, this was experienced by staff 
as morally distressing and could be interpreted as an insult 
to his human dignity.
The term “violation” was also used to describe experi-
ences of convincing patients with full decision-making 
capacity to undergo medical interventions, perceived by 
staff as necessary, such as an operation for vessel access 
preceding dialysis treatment. Patients’ rejection of care was 
seen as the hallmark of insufficient comprehension of their 
medical situation and needs, not as an expression of delib-
erately declining to take part in offered care. In these situ-
ations, participants expressed a responsibility to convince 
the patient about the necessity of the intervention, and, in 
some situations, they described applying quite harsh pres-
sure, a strategy that participants sometimes experienced as 
a violation.
Then I felt that I have to push quite hard because it 
will not save her if she doesn’t get this surgery. She 
got her surgery later. Sometimes you almost have to 
do a little violation. (Dialysis care).
Although the staff defended their actions from a moral 
point of view, they were still concerned that the patients 
could experience their actions as disrespectful and as a 
threat to their human dignity, as well as to their autonomy.
How to establish a responsible relationship 
with the vulnerable person
Acknowledging the patient as a susceptible human 
being in a psychosocial context
Participants described the patient in the ethically difficult 
situation as vulnerable. They expressed awareness of the 
patient’s dependency on the staff and the patient’s psy-
chological exposure by their loss of health and need for 
support. This situation required, according to the staff, a 
relationship built on trust and confidence.
The participants expected of themselves that they be in 
a position to read the patient’s state of mind. They wanted 
to pay attention to the various concerns and anxieties that 
go with being ill, and tried to identify patients who needed 
the support and presence of staff. In the following case, the 
staff discussed a patient who recently became dependent 
on dialysis:
I think she felt very exposed and she is used to be in 
full control of the situation. Now someone else had 
control. (Dialysis care).
Getting to know the patient was regarded as a valuable 
tool, as well as a prerequisite in the framing of care con-
sistent with the patient’s needs and wishes. The partici-
pants aimed at viewing the patient’s health problem as 
a part of his or her entire life story, and regarded the 
patient’s psychosocial situation to be important in the 
delivery of good care.
Participants also acknowledged that patients had psy-
chological and social difficulties that complicated their 
medical treatment. Diseases such as diabetes and kidney 
failure were seen as requiring significant effort from the 
patient, and the professionals experienced that factors such 
as a lack of social support from the family, economic dif-
ficulties and psychiatric illnesses, all influenced patients’ 
capability to take care of themselves.
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Protecting the patient’s dignity and integrity 
through practical measures in care
Participants considered it important to try to protect the 
patient’s dignity in the midst of illness, regardless of age 
or whether there was a need for technical procedures. 
Patients’ dignity was to be protected through the form-
ing of daily care. Concern was expressed about patients 
being in what participants considered to be undignified 
situations, and they felt a responsibility to resolve or bring 
such undignified situations to an end. With the confused 
and naked patient, the staff felt obliged to dress her against 
her will:
To say that they have freedom of choice, do as you 
want, go around here in the hospital completely nude. 
Then I’d probably had felt more remorse for this situ-
ation instead, that I hadn’t done what I should have 
done. (Internal medicine).
The importance of protecting the patient’s integrity was 
discussed. Integrity was understood both as a physical 
and bodily concept and as a psychological concept of pri-
vacy. Bodily integrity could be challenged during proce-
dures and interventions. Staff paid attention to patients 
who needed support in the protection of their physical 
integrity when undergoing reiterated treatments such as 
dialysis. However, conflicting purposes were experienced 
when they had to balance patients’ need for privacy with 
accommodations in single rooms and closed doors against 
their need of supervision for medical safety. Being a part 
of institutionalized health care was also perceived as a 
threat to the integrity and privacy of families, and the staff 
tried to balance protection of integrity and dignity with the 
patients’ needs of practical procedures and interventions.
Professionals saw the close and compassionate relation-
ships between patients that took place as being important, 
but also viewed this phenomenon as a potential threat to 
patient privacy and integrity. Hence, some patients were 
regarded as being in need of protection against distur-
bances from other patients. Such protective measures were 
considered to be morally important.
Defining personal moral responsibility 
towards the patient
Responsibility emerged as an important subject during 
the discussions. This concerned both professional and 
personal responsibility. The staff expressed a responsibil-
ity to fulfil the patients’ medical and nursing needs. This 
responsibility was a fundamental part of the professional 
role that many of the discussions proceeded from.
Well, I hope someone else could come by because I 
won’t find time myself. But she’s my responsibility 
today. (Geriatric rehabilitation).
How far this personal responsibility extended was a mat-
ter of debate, but so was the extent to which the gen-
eral responsibility of the professional healthcare system 
reached. The staff expressed a will to help and support 
patients in difficult situations, but also felt a need to step 
back in situations where they failed to achieve better care 
for the patients. They described situations where they per-
ceived it to be necessary to delimit their commitments. 
This was typically suitable when the patient had severe 
psychosocial problems and it was believed that the health-
care system had limited possibilities to help.
They also discussed the patient’s personal responsibili-
ties. Typically, this issue emerged in the discussion when 
deliberating to what extent it was legitimate to try to influ-
ence the patient.
She has been fully informed. We can’t do anything 
more. She’s a grown-up human being. You could 
have that attitude as well and then let it go. (Dialysis 
care)
Having patience to give the patient and family time 
to come to terms with illness and declining health
The dialogue evolved around patients who were rapidly 
declining in health. Older patients were deteriorating or 
facing death, and had increasing needs of support. Chronic 
illness, such as kidney failure, entailed deterioration with 
a need for continued treatment. It was acknowledged that 
patients and families needed time to become accustomed 
to new circumstances in life, the need for new treatments, 
or for moving to a nursing home. These needs seemed 
obvious to the professionals, however, the patient and fam-
ily struggled with participating in the process due to what 
the staff saw as a lack of comprehension of the current 
situation. It was perceived that they needed more time to 
understand the new situation, and the staff regarded this as 
being morally important. This necessitated both patience 
and awareness of staff in order to wait for the patient and 
their family to come to terms with change.
I think we’re quite sensitive and try to adjust the hos-
pital stay according to how far the family has come in 
their processing of the patient’s illness. And it is evi-
dent that if you have been married for 60 years and 
one is moving to a nursing home and I am staying 
at the house, it’s like a divorce. (Internal medicine)
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Discussion
The present study highlights the ethical conflict in eve-
ryday practice between comprehending the values and 
beliefs of patients and their families and framing the care 
according to professional responsibilities. The healthcare 
professionals’ moral reasoning can be likened to a see-
saw of principle-based reasoning, undulating between their 
own professional convictions of what constitutes good care 
for the patient on one side, and the patient’s wishes and 
preferences on the other (Fig. 2). As the basis for the undu-
lation, a relational-oriented reflection over a responsible 
relationship with the patient as a vulnerable person sur-
rounded the dialogue (Fig. 2). The study shows that in 
MCDs that are conducted close to everyday care, princi-
ple-based and relational-oriented ethics complement each 
other. This is a significantly different composition than 
discussing hypothetical patient cases or patients not known 
to the participants, where relationships and emotions are 
often absent. Rasoal et al. showed, in the larger Euro-MCD 
project, how the MCDs departed from a sense of power-
lessness, uncertainty and unease in the relationships with 
the patient and family (Rasoal et al. 2015), and how these 
feelings seem important for informing the moral reason-
ing process (Molewijk et al. 2011). The mixed-method 
article that complements the results discussed in the cur-
rent article, shows that the need for the participants to talk 
about professional relationships and restoration of their 
own wellbeing, may also be essential in order to manage 
ethically difficult situations and thus eventually contribute 
to good patient care (Svantesson et al. 2017).
Unsurprisingly, the moral reasoning discussed in 
the present paper was infused with discussions about 
patient autonomy. However, these findings may help us 
to understand the professionals’ perceptions of patient 
autonomy in the midst of clinical practice, and may 
be interpreted through the framework of ‘relational 
autonomy’(Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000a). Autonomy, as it 
emerged from the liberal tradition, has been seen as a neg-
ative right to shape your life unhindered by others based 
on our own defined values (Jennings 2016). The moral 
agent, in this perspective, is both rational and independent, 
exercises free will, and has full moral responsibility for his 
or her actions (Materstvedt 2011). Furthermore, autonomy 
in the bioethical context has traditionally been equated 
with the ability to give informed consent to treatment or 
to decline such; a meaning of autonomy that originated 
from the field of research ethics (Dodds 2000). In the ideal 
health care service the patient and the professional meet 
each other on an equal level; the professional gives suffi-
cient information, and the patient is free to accept or refuse 
treatment based on their own values (Donchin 2001).
In the present study, the professionals described their 
patients as being severely ill and in distress, all of which 
affected their decision-making capacity. Evidently, the ideal 
situation described above did not seem sufficient to help the 
professionals in facing the ethical difficulties, but the staff 
still had to deal with the patients’ decline, ambivalence or 
different kinds of unwillingness against the offered and, in 
their view, necessary health care. They strongly advocated 
that they could not leave the patient with their perceived 
insufficient and incorrect decisions which they thought 
would lead to considerable harm due to lack of care. They 
were at the same time morally troubled by the use of power 
to try to influence the patient and the risk of violating the 
patient’s dignity and integrity.
Contrary to autonomy interpreted in the traditional sense, 
‘relational autonomy’ might serve as a better interpretative 
tool to understand the professionals’ struggles in the pre-
sent findings. Feminist philosophers have been criticizing 
the traditional concept of autonomy and what is taken to be 
its failure in contributing to the interpretation of autonomy 
in health care (Donchin 2001; Jennings 2016; Pullman and 
Hodgkinson 2016). Feminist philosophy has claimed that 
the traditional view on autonomy is based on a masculine 
character, ideally capable of living a self-sufficient, isolated 
and independent life separated from others (Mackenzie and 
Stoljar 2000a). This conception stands in opposition to the 
primarily feminine experiences of the care of, as well as the 
dependency on, others, and has been perceived as a devalu-
ation of women’s experiences and the values arising from 
them (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000b).
Relational autonomy has been suggested as an alternative 
framework for the understanding of autonomy in clinical 
practice (Dodds 2000). The concept departs from the rela-
tional-oriented ethics of care, and captures the need to frame 
the patient’s autonomy within a responsible relationship with 
others (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000a). According to ethics of 
care, human beings are vulnerable and dependent upon one 
another; we are deeply situated in relation to other people 
and, consequently, this is the starting point for an alternative 
approach to autonomy as well as to our moral life as a whole 
(Pettersen 2011). Instead of framing autonomy in terms of 
a negative freedom, relational autonomy is described as 
the positive freedom to make judgments according to one’s 
own values and goals (Verkerk 2001). Relational autonomy 
demands engagement from professionals to support and pro-
mote a patient’s autonomy in making judgements that are 
true to their own wishes and values (Mackenzie 2008; Wid-
dershoven and Abma 2011). Threats to patient autonomy 
mainly come from abandonment by the professionals, not 
because of interference, in the decision-making process.
This means that the professionals in the present findings 
would not leave their patients to make decisions which they 
judge as not being in the patients’ best interests. But even 
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more important, they struggled with respecting the deci-
sions of the patients, which they were not convinced were 
made truly according to the patients’ wishes for their health 
and future. The professionals experienced that the patients 
refused necessary care due to anxiety, distress or confusion, 
and not due to careful considerations based on adequate 
decision-making ability. They felt that their responsibility 
was to not leave the patient to deal with the consequences 
of their inadequate decisions, but instead, through learning 
to know their patients as persons and by striving to capture 
the patients’ perspective, to try to guide the patient to good 
care. They struggled to understand the processes the patient 
and their families went through when they suddenly became 
ill or when the chronic illness worsened, and with how to 
work through the individualizing of support.
A key aspect of relational autonomy, and as shown in the 
present study, was to acknowledge and establish a respon-
sible relationship with the vulnerable person. Vulnerabil-
ity has been seen as both something that encompasses all 
humans as we through life experience illness and injury, as 
well as loss and grief, but the view that some humans are 
more vulnerable than others, and hence need extra attention 
and protection, has also dominated (Martin et al. 2014). The 
professionals in the present study considered the patients to 
be especially vulnerable due to their loss of health and need 
for support, but also due to their physical circumstances, 
such as undergoing hospital care and coming to terms with 
new circumstances in life. Traditionally, vulnerability and 
autonomy have been seen as contradictory phenomena 
(Mackenzie et al. 2014). Vulnerability is linked with help-
lessness, neediness and victimhood; hence, the protection 
of vulnerable people has been viewed as an open door to 
paternalistic and coercive forms of intervention (Christman 
2014). The professionals struggled with the interpretation 
of the patient’s wishes and preferences for care, but while 
concurrently striving to accomplish what they interpreted 
as satisfactorily medical and nursing care for a vulnerable 
human being.
The balance appeared to tilt in favour of the profession-
als’ convictions of what they conceived as the patient’s best 
interest and they could be regarded as displaying a pater-
nalistic attitude in claiming to know what is best for the 
patient (see Fig. 2). Paternalism is understood as interfer-
ence, either against one’s will or without one’s consent, in 
the aim of promoting the good, and is in general not ethically 
justifiable (Materstvedt 2011). Weaker forms of paternal-
ism might be justifiable in situations where the patient’s 
ability to display autonomy is significantly impaired due to 
acute or chronic illness, as observed in the present findings 
(Christman 2014). In spite of this, and perhaps surprisingly, 
the professionals experienced moral distress when trying 
to convince patients to partake in measures and interven-
tions which they judged to be in the patients’ best interests. 
Noticeably, they frequently employed the strong notion of 
“violation” to describe their moral feelings in the interaction 
with patients. Although the professionals considered their 
actions to be ethically justifiable, they nonetheless described 
the moral distress of the patient’s situation in the encounter. 
The patients were not present during the MCDs and this 
might be seen as a weakness of the MCD method. However, 
in the present study, the facilitators influenced the reason-
ing by trying to adopt the perspective of the absent patient 
and their family. In interviews with these facilitators in a 
previous study, they themselves pointed out the importance 
of being the patient’s voice, as well as a need to challenge 
the healthcare professionals’ homogenous reflections. Their 
challenge of simultaneously adopting the disparate roles of 
being accommodative and challenging seemed to enhance 
their moral reasoning as well as restoring the participants’ 
sense of wellbeing (Rasoal et al. 2017).
Conclusion
Moral reasoning in MDCs is apparently infused by discus-
sions about providing autonomy for vulnerable patients. In 
theory, promoting respect for a patient’s autonomy is quite 
uncontroversial, but, to deal with autonomy in everyday care 
is far more complicated. The vulnerable severely ill patients’ 
diminished capacity, together with healthcare profession-
als’ responsibility to secure good care, demonstrates a need 
for a relational approach to autonomy. Autonomy for the 
vulnerable patient can only be achieved by interaction and 
engagement, rather than abandoning the patient to decide for 
themselves. Although the conception of relational autonomy 
cannot solve all ethical problems, relational autonomy is 
helpful for understanding healthcare professionals’ extended 
responsibility to learn to know their patients through their 
life stories, and to enable them to frame the care according 
to the patients’ most profound wishes and values, that is to 
say, to practice person-centered care.
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